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Abstract
Countries like Poland with a recent sharp drop in birth rates still have
some time to prepare for the problems of an ageing society. Ater the year
2030 they can become increasingly serious.
Retirement gets difficult to support if everybody lives longer, the birth rates
go down, and retirement age and immigration/emigration remain constant. This
demographic change influences the ratio of people in retirement age to those of
working age. These effects have been simulated by statistical offices in many
countries, but also with detailed assumptions in journals and a book [1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
the latter two references give a complete Fortran program.
These methods, with minor adjustments, were used to predict the future
growth of this ratio for countries with low birth rates like Germany [1, 2, 6],
intermediate birth rates like Algeria, [3] and high birth rates like the Palestinian
territories [5], always ignoring special historical events which are particular for
this country. Now we apply this method to a country like Poland where massive
immigration may be less realistic; instead we simulate increases of birth rate
and retirement age. Simulation details are shifted to an appendix.
The decay of the birth rate (more precisely, the average number of chil-
dren per women, unfortunately called the total fertility rate) came in Poland
later but sharper than in Germany and is approximated by 2.3 − 0.55 ∗ [1 +
tanh(0.15(year− 1993))], Fig.1. The total simulated population, normalized by
the actual Polish population in 2002, agrees well with what the official Polish
authority, www.stat.gov.pl, predicted: Fig.2. Fig.3 shows the ratio of people
above retirement age of 63 to the people between 20 and retirement age (lower
curve). (Our time units are years throughout.)
The future looks less problematic if the number of people up to age 20
is added to those above 63, both groups needing public support. Then the
ratio is approaching a minimum: middle curve in Fig.3. Thus for some time,
according to Fig.3 until about 2030, the fraction of people needing support from
the working population will not be much higher than it was in the past. THus
one has some years time to think, discuss and agree on how to solve the future
problems of demographic change. The upper curve there shows the effects of
a net emigration of 0.1 percent per year, starting in 2010 (e.g. from Poland
to Western Europe; some statistical data give higher values already now). In
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Figure 1: Real and assumed births. The + come from the official Polish statis-
tics, the line is the tannh approximation used in the present simulations.
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Figure 2: Official (line) and present (+ symbols) extrapolations of Polish pop-
ulation.
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Figure 3: Ratio of old to working-age people. For the two upper curves the
young people were added to the old ones. Border ages are 20 and 63.
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Figure 4: Help from increased births. The lowest curve uses the present birth
rate, the higher curves assume more or less strong increases of births in the
future.
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Figure 5: Help from increased births and increased retirement age. Same sim-
ulation as in the previous figure; the rise of retirement age from 63 to 67 does
not affect the total population shown in the previous figure.
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Figure 6: Ratio of old to working-age people for different Gompertz slopes 0.093
(plus signs, Germany) and 0.08 (other curves, Polish men).
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Figure 7: Populations for different Gompertz slopes, same simulations as in
previous figure.
the past this emigration was negligibly small, about 0.04 percent per year. The
lowest curve in Fig.4 shows the resulting decay of the total population.
To get more optimistic curves, the retirement age was assumed to increase
from 63 by one year and the births by 0.2 in the years 2020, 2025, 2030 and 2035;
increase in retirement age alone did not help much. These assumptions give the
x symbols in Fig.4. The two lines on both sides of the x curve correspond
to changes 0.25 (higher line) and 0.15 (lower line) in the births and indicate
the order of magnitude of the extrapolation errors. Fig.5 shows the ratios of
people in retirement age to people in working age, corresponding to the same
simulations as in Fig.4.
In the above simulations the Gompertz slope was taken as b = 0.093, with
the mortality function increasing for adults as exp(bx) with increasing age x,
as in [1, 2]. The actual Polish value is near 0.08 similar to Algeria[3]. Using
b = 0.08 instead of 0.093 we get Figs.6 and 7, which overlap with the results of
Figs.4 and 5.
Thus enhanced birth rates as simulated here and massive immigration as
simulated for countries like Germany [1, 4] could reduce the shrinking of the
population and the burden of the working population to support the retired
people. That burden would also be alleviated by increasing retirement age;
German parliament adopted in 2006 a law regulating these future increases.
France recently increased the births from 1.7 to 1.9 within a decade. Other
countries in the European Union, like Bulgaria, Romania or the three Baltic
states, may be in a situation similar to Poland.
Simulations like these took less than a second each, in contrast to more
sophisticated methods [7], and readers can change parameters to check for the
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effects of different assumptions. Countries corresponding to these simulations
still have time to adjust to the future problems of the demographic change. The
ageing problems seem to become very serious after the year 2050.
K. Ku lakowski kindly provided the empirical Polish data from www.stat.gov.pl
used in this work, and commented on the manuscript.
Appendix:
The simulations calculate the age distribution of the population in one year
from that in the preceding year, neglecting possible correlations between a
mother and her daughters. For extrapolations over a few generations this ap-
proximation should be good enough. A complete Fortran program is given in
[4, 5].
Women give birth from ages 21 and 40, of daughters with half of the birth
number given in the text, spread evenly over these 20 years. Sons represent the
other half and can be neglected. The population increases by immigration or
decreases by emigration, affecting equally all ages from 6 to 40. The mortality
is assumed as 7b exp[b(x−X), giving a survival probability S(x) from birth to
age x as S = exp(−7 exp(−bX)(exp(bx)− 1)). Thus after births and migration
have been dealt with, the population P (x) at age x is calculated from P (x) =
P (x− 1)S(x)/S(x− 1). Here the Gompertz slope b is assumed to increase over
150 years from b = 0.07 to b = 0.093 (or 0.08) until the year 1971, and then to
stay constant at this maximum value. The characteristic age X , in contrast, is
assumed to stay constant at 103 until 1971, and thereafter to increase by 0.15
each year. This change of trends around 1971 was seen in some empirical studies
of the last years.
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